Southern Thailand Conflict Essay Example
Southern Thailand Conflict Essay Example

Southern Thailand Conflict Essay Example

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  • Pages: 12 (3141 words)
  • Published: August 19, 2018
  • Type: Research Paper
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Executive Summary

Despite the Kingdom of Thailand achieving a relatively high level of economic prosperity and ensuring the basic financial and social well-being of its community, it cannot be considered the best place to live due to one factor. The southern provinces of Thailand have been plagued by interracial conflicts, despite the country's economic and industrial achievements. The conflicts are believed to be exacerbated by various driving forces, ranging from the communist party to potential allies in international terrorism. This paper examines the possible involvement of different social forces in Thailand, highlighting the local radical organizations as the main antagonists to the Thai government. The core reasons for the rebellion stem from the economic and political isolation of the provinces. Although the conflict has not escalated to its maximum intensity, it is evident that resolving it requires a deep understan

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ding of the belligerents' goals, objectives, programs, and social base. The insurgents primarily rely on the separatist tendencies of the Islamic minorities in the Southern Provinces, while the Thai government armed forces closely work with the Buddhist community.

In this text, two factors contributing to the escalation of the conflict in Thailand have been identified: religious differences and geographical divisions. The prevailing international perspective is that unless peaceful negotiations are initiated between the rebels and the Thai government, the conflict will remain unresolved.

Introduction

The first significant incident of violence between insurgents and government forces occurred in late 2004 in the Malay Pattani region. This area became a hotbed for revolutionaries who strongly opposed the policies of the Thai government. January 4, 2004 is recognized as the official start date of the conflict (Chalk

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2008). On that day, a group of armed individuals invaded a military camp in Narathiwat, a province in Southern Thailand. They killed four soldiers and acquired a large amount of military equipment (Imtyaz, 2009).

The next day, two police officers were brutally killed using explosives (McCargo, 2008). In response, the government officially declared martial law in Southern provinces of Thailand. This resulted in the establishment of a special military regime with extensive powers granted to the Thai government's military forces. However, this decision was not well-received by insurgent factions and violence continued to escalate. For instance, in 2005, the reported death toll reached 1,500 individuals with 2,400 individuals suffering severe injuries. Similarly, in 2007, there were 2,600 individuals killed and 4,000 individuals seriously injured (Zachary, 2011).

Notably, it is important to emphasize the character of the rebellion forces and their tactic and strategic maneuverings. According to independent research agencies, the parties were well-armed and equipped with advanced and sophisticated weaponry (Croissant, 2007). There were no reports of revolutionaries running out of bullets or cartridges, and the infantry of the guerillas wore bulletproof vests and helmets (Thanspiring, 2009). The conflict first began in the 1960s, with over 60 armed bands causing havoc in the region (De Silva, 1988).

In the 1980s, laws were implemented to grant amnesty to those who surrendered their weapons, leading to many Muslim military chiefs taking advantage of this opportunity. The amnesty program was successful in quelling military conflicts by the mid-1990s. However, with the start of the new millennium, violence resumed and a crucial event occurred on January 4, 2004. This was known as the "bloody" January and was marked by the mutinous separatists

employing new tactics to brutally eliminate local religious and spiritual leaders.

During April and October of 2004, the government implemented a harsh crackdown on armed insurgents. This led to over 1,500 individuals being detained and imprisoned. Many of these insurgents were apprehended during Ramadan, a holy month for Muslims (Chalk, 2008). As they were being transported to local police stations, overcrowding in police trucks caused nearly a hundred individuals to suffocate and die due to the pressure from their neighbors (Croissant, 2007).

The government's repressive actions sparked opposition forces to launch violent attacks. This resulted in the deaths of multiple police officers and local government agents. By mid-2006, it became evident that the Thai government was unable to control the escalating conflict. Independent research agencies as well as government organizations closely monitored the situation.

The contemporary escalation of the conflict between the Islamic minority and the traditional Buddhism government of Thailand has various causes, which are being closely studied by scholars and political analysts. This paper aims to outline and analyze the main reasons behind the armed clashes in the country.

The Insurgent Forces of the Conflict and the Finance of the Campaign

The Revolutionary movement in Thailand has unique characteristics. Unlike other revolutionary movements in the world, such as the Palestine-Israel conflict, the goals and objectives of the insurgents in Thailand are not clearly defined. Different war chiefs have different demands, including the establishment of autonomous laws and government order in certain provinces or the declaration of independence.

The claims made by the revolutionary elements have not been clearly formulated yet. One of the most significant assertions involves the creation of a separate Muslim country in the insurgent provinces (Harish,

2006, 45). Additionally, the financial base of the insurgent campaign needs to be thoroughly examined (Wyatt, 2003, 14). It can be confidently assumed that substantial monetary resources are regularly spent to ensure that the revolution forces are well-equipped and have enough cartridges and ammunition. However, the source of these revenues remains unclear (Chalk, 2008). According to some analysts, the money is obtained through drug smuggling and illegal oil transfers, while others suggest that foreign terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda fund the campaign (Croissant, 2007).

The Muslim Rebellion Forces

One of the most unique aspects of this armed conflict is that the Thai government and the international community are unable to determine who exactly they are fighting against. In other words, the insurgents have managed to skillfully conceal their identities. There is no consensus among analysts in this field (Phongpaicht, 2004). Some believe that the attacks are carried out by local insurgent groups in Thailand, such as the BRN group, the PULO movement, and other military elements of the Ronda Kumpulan Kecil, a movement driven by religious motives aiming to establish a Muslim dictatorship and implement sharia law in Thailand (McCargo, 2008, 19). Another widely held belief is that foreign Islamic groups have had an influence on the insurgent forces in Thailand. These groups are believed to have trained and equipped the insurgents.

For example, it has been reported that the 2004 attackers received their preparatory military course at the Al-Qaeda training camps in Pakistan.

The PULO Organization

The PULO Organization, which is the first highly probable suspect and perhaps the most influential terrorist group in the country, has gained popularity among the religious Islamic minorities of Thailand in the

last decade (Zachary, 2011). This organization has the advantage of being politically represented in both national and local councils, setting it apart from other insurgent movements (Chalk, 2008). The organization has engaged in negotiations with other revolutionary trends and its military and political Chiefs have worked to unite insurgent forces.

In particular, Me Kuteh, the military and spiritual leader of the PULO organization, is reported to be the key figure in the process of unification. The agreement reached between the insurgent forces is a treaty that establishes the creation of the unified armed forces, known as the Patani Liberation Army, and grants the unified command authority over operations (McCargo, 2008). It is important to emphasize that despite the organization's alleged terrorist actions, they also engage in peaceful negotiations with international humanitarian and intergovernmental organizations (Croissant, 2007). The report titled "Conditions of Muslim Communities and Minorities in Jeddah" is submitted to various institutions as evidence and a means to somehow justify their activities.

The Local Bandits and Muslim Partisans

Another highly possible scenario is that the insurgent forces have no connection to global terrorism (Wyattm 2003, 44). The attacks on government institutions are primarily driven by local Muslim authorities seeking retaliation for the severe oppression faced by their fellow believers within Thailand.

In 2002, the Thai prime minister and Thai army chief claimed that all wrongdoings and crimes in the country were the work of "local bandits and drug traffickers" and denied the presence of separatists or ideological terrorists. However, the implementation of Martial law in the provinces affected by local Jihad changed the official viewpoint of Thailand, reflecting a more realistic understanding of the situation (McCargo, 2008, 73).

The Communists

One

theory suggested the involvement of pro-communist elements in Southern Thailand. Despite extensive and costly investigations, no evidence of communist involvement was found (Harish, 2006). However, there are connections between the rebellious forces in Thailand and similar religious activities in the Philippines, specifically with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.

The Points of Contention

To comprehend the nature of the conflict and understand its triggers, it is crucial to analyze the reasons behind the outbreak of armed hostilities. Drawing specific conclusions from this analysis can help prevent similar negative circumstances in the future.

The collaboration of scholarly authorities, military analysts, and political analysts led to the conclusion that the main reasons for the conflict of interests are the animosity between Muslim and Buddhist communities, economic shutdown, and political isolation in the rioting provinces. This section of the paper examines the hypothetical factors that may have contributed to the escalation of military outbreak in the region.

The Discrimination of Islamic Minorities

Under the theory of revolution, it is natural to assume that bandit forces and local partisans have organized a well-planned and thoroughly considered campaign spontaneously. In other words, this military struggle against the Thailand Armed Forces was initiated instinctively as a folk response to the alleged oppression of Muslim minorities. Although there is no evidence to support this claim, it is often reported that the Islamic minorities in Thailand are routinely and arbitrarily discriminated against by the government (Fearon ; Laitin, 2005). To investigate this accusation further, international independent research agencies have conducted surveys.

The published reports from Freedom House and Amnesty International clearly show that Muslim discrimination did not occur in Thailand. Muslims had the same rights as

Buddhists, including access to education and government positions (Wyatt, 2003, 81). Even the commander in chief of the armed forces is Muslim. However, mutinous leaders claim that discrimination is widespread and the government is unofficially promoting it to make Thailand a purely Buddhist state, ignoring Muslim rights and privilegs (Camilleri, 2008).

Ethnical Enmity among the Islamic and the Buddhism Communities

The issue of ethnicity has always been a topic in Southern Thailand.

The mindsets and life-concerned approaches of different communities are inherently different. These communities have opposing values and beliefs. For instance, Buddhists respect and value women's rights, while under sharia law, women's rights are limited and discriminatory from a democratic standpoint. Additionally, Islamic citizens believe that since the population of the Southern Provinces in Thailand is predominantly Muslim, the rule of law and government order in these provinces should also be Islamic (Thanprsansing, 2009) (Imtyaz, 2009,14).

According to scholarly opinion, this issue is not about religion but rather lifestyle and traditions (Zachary, 2011). The Buddhist communities in the region, however, oppose Islamic trends. The government of the Kingdom of Thailand also supports this opinion by appointing local officials with Buddhist religious affiliation. While there is a maintained proportion of Islamic and Buddhist officials in key positions such as judges, investigators, and workers in the office of prosecution, the Thai government has failed to ensure equal representation of Islamic and Buddhist public officials. This matter is not regulated on a legislative level in Thailand, resulting in an imbalanced ratio of the Islamic population (approximately 60% of the regions) to their representation in local councils and the appointed government (28 Islamic public officers) (Zachary, 2011).

Despite the lack of evidence showing

any impact on quality of life, Muslims in the Southern Provinces are concerned about their religious freedom and adherence to Sharia law being endangered. Experts widely attribute this concern as the main trigger for the conflict.

The Conflict's Economic Factors

The regions where riots have occurred are among the least developed areas in the nation. The government prioritizes allocating economic resources mainly to regions that adhere to Buddhism as the prevailing religion.

However, the decision to invest in industries dominated by Buddhists in Thailand was driven by economic considerations rather than religious motives (Chalk, 2008). The disproportions in the distribution of investments are not understood by members of terrorist groups and other insurgent elements.

The Thai Government's Attempts, Tasks, and Problems in Addressing the Situation

The Thai government adopted a two-pronged approach to tackle the insurgency. Defense minister Chavalit initially focused on military measures (Harish, 2006, 52). The government supported the armed actions of the Thai Armed Forces, and the aggressive acts by Thai insurgents led to extensive military operations. One notable incident occurred on April 24, 2004, when a group of combatants attacked several police stations and captured the Krue Se Mosque in the rebellious Pattani region.

When the mosque was seized by terrorists, the Defense Minister immediately decided to attack the invaders instead of considering a peaceful solution (Croissant, 2007). This resulted in no negotiations taking place, as the government forces' general rejected all attempts by the insurgents to engage in conciliatory talks and resolve the conflict peacefully. While capturing the mosque was a means to attract public attention, despite being a terrorist act, the majority of the international community condemned the immediate elimination of the gunmen who had

invaded the mosque (Zachary, 2011). A similar oppressive reaction occurred in October 2004, when Thai forces apprehended six Muslim activists suspected of supplying weaponry and ammunition to insurgent forces.

The Thai administration's arbitrary arrest of activists led to large public rallies and a series of protests. Water cannons were used to disperse the crowds, which only intensified the protests (Chalk, 2008). Ultimately, the army fired upon the crowd, resulting in the death of seven individuals.

The Challenges Faced by the Thai Government in Regaining Control over the Situation

Several significant obstacles hindered the Thai government's ability to effectively suppress the growing unrest among the population.

This section of the paper discusses the main barriers that are preventing stability within the country.
The Thai Army and Thai National Conciliatory Commission lack competent professionals.
To effectively address the Muslims, the government campaigners need to fully understand the Islamic mindsets. Specifically, they need to understand the cultural peculiarities and their willingness to sacrifice their lives and well-being without hesitation. Negotiations and talks with them require specific approaches and mediation techniques. In total, ethnic minorities make up only 10% of the Thai army (Camilleri, 2008), and there has been no special detachment established to interact with the Islamic insurgents.

According to leading independent research, the Thai forces should establish special commissions and negotiation detachments to foster rapport and cooperation between the insurgents and the government forces. By doing so, the government campaign will successfully achieve its ultimate goals. The lack of mutual understandings poses a major obstacle in fostering cooperation between the mutinous elements of the community and the official armed forces of the

Thai government.


Geographical location and population composition

In geographical terms, the Southern provinces are in close proximity to Muslim countries, resulting in significant influence from them. The Thai government must always take this into account. The density of the Islamic population should not be underestimated either, and there are limited options available to address this situation. Mass relocations and deportations are not viable solutions, so the best course of action for Thailand is to engage in negotiations with the rebels, as recommended by the European Union's Conciliatory Commission.

International perception of the situation

The international democratic community disapproves of the methods and techniques used by the insurrectional elements in Southern Thailand communities (Zachary, 2011). These include the capture of hostages, violent attacks on state officials, and casualties inflicted on civilians during government attacks. Such acts are considered acts of terrorism under international and domestic laws in Thailand and other countries.

The opinion of the United States

The opinion of the United States was expressed by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who accused the Islamic protests in Thailand of having a terrorist nature. However, she also condemned the approaches taken by the Thai government to address the negative consequences of the situation. During her speech to the United States Congress in 2004, Rice emphasized that the killing of Muslims who had occupied a mosque without a proper and legally formalized trial was a blatant violation of international human rights law.

This opinion was subsequently supported by the resolution of the United States Congress, whereby the Congress recommends the government of Thailand to enter into the peaceful talks with the insurrection elements.

The Opinion of

the United Nations Organizations

The opinion of the United Nations Organizations was delivered by the United States Security Council in 2008. The report of this organization extensively examined the situation in Thailand and the conclusion of the experts was unanimous: the people who instigated and who participate in the riots are terrorists and their actions constitute terrorist acts, as they precisely meet the internationally acknowledged definition (Zachary, 2011).

Conclusions

Having made a profound examination of the situation in Thailand it can be inferred that several internal and external factors contribute to the further escalation of the conflict and serious measures must be permanently considered by the Thailand government and armed forces to handle the situation, in particular the cultural and the religious peculiarities of the insurgents should be permanently considered by the government authorities which tackle the conflict.

The inability of the Thailand Government Armed Forces to identify and address the character of the enemy has become apparent. While indications point to the local Muslim separatists being supported by international terrorist forces, certainty has not been achieved. In order to establish a link between the acts of violence against Thai authorities and Islamic Radical groups, evidence needs to be collected and presented. Currently, the Thai forces are not fulfilling this obligation. In summary, the Thailand government is unable to precisely identify the enemy at present.

The last issue, which is not the least, is understanding the conflict. Scholars and analysts have concluded that the conflict has economic, political, religious, and cultural origins. Simply understanding these factors is enough to begin a thorough analysis. By conducting the analysis accordingly, the enemies and their goals will be identified, ultimately leading to a

resolution of the conflict through peaceful means.
Internationally, there is no unanimous opinion. While some countries, including the USA, condemn the actions of both belligerents, the NATO and the European Union support the opinion of the Thai government and the current actions taken by the Armed Forces of Thailand.

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