Afghanistan Essay Example

hostilities.

The United State’s foreign policy towards Afghanistan was affected to a great deal, by the horrendous conditions that the Afghan people were left to endure as a result of a decade long war with the Soviet Union, the oppressive reign of the Taliban and the invasion of their country by the United States as well as a number of preexisting conditions such as the crippling poverty and crippling opium trade. As a result, the task of rebuilding the infrastructure of Afghanistan; something that remains one of the most important aspects of current American foreign policy, has taken longer than previously believed.

Modern day U. S/ Afghanistan foreign policy began in 1979 with the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan. The war involved communist and anti-communist forces. The number of Soviet forces in the country reached 100,000 in 1980 and was the chief motivating factor for President Carter to boycott the 1980 Summer Olympics in Moscow later that year. The Afghan forces were backed by Islamic fighter called the mujahidin. They fought both the Soviets as well as the Afghan president at the time, Barak Karmal.

Due to the fact that this occurred during the Cold War and there existed between the Soviet Union and the United States, no love loss, despite being no friend to Islamic extremists as the mujahidin clearly were, the CIA, prompted by President Reagan, supported the Taliban and other Afghan forces. “By 1983, the CIA was purchasing a variety of different weapons for use by Taliban forces. ” These included grenade launchers, land mines and antiaircraft weapons. This totaled more than 10,000 tons of arms and equipments which were designed to help repel the

Soviet Forces from the country of Afghanistan.

Further support of not only the Afghan forces, but the escalation of direct support being given to the Islamic terrorist forces, began in 1985. The CIA would then take control and take part in an escalation of support and the supplication of force in a number of different and very deadly ways/ Satellite reconnaissance data regarding Soviet targets as well as Soviet information that has been intercepted by US intelligence, was then relayed to Afghan forces. “Amidst intensifying debate within the CIA over the extent of U. S. involvement in the war, Reagan made the decision to equip the mujahidin with supplicated U.

S. made Stinger antiaircraft missiles… By 1987, the CIA was sending a steady supply of 65,000 tons of arms to the mujahidin. ” In total, the United States had supplied up to seven different Islamic fighting forces, more than $2 billion in weapons and money, making it the largest covert action since the end of WWII. “It seemed as though such actions had a lasting positive result when in 1988, before the fall of the Soviet Union, President Mikhail Gorbachev announced that Soviet Troops would withdraw from Afghanistan. ” It seemed for a time, that the support of the mujahidin was a smart and profitable move.

The Soviet Union had been defeated, a defeat which helped to increase the collapse of the Soviet Union. This would not be the case. Now that the Soviet Union had been dispelled from their country, the mujahidin was now ever more powerful than ever and began to attack the Afghan government who they felt was too secular. It was the motivation of

the muhadin to instill an extreme Islamic state within the borders of Afghanistan. “Afghanistan thus became a fragmented country of several independent zones, each ruled by different warlords.

These political divisions exacerbated the schism already present between Sunni and Shiite Muslims, and between the many tribal and ethnic groups that reside in the country. ” Such disunion would help to usher in the reign of the Taliban, who through crippling actions, actions which were met by force, many rights that are taken for granted in most of the Western Hemisphere, was suspended in Afghanistan. Women were treated as second class citizens and only things that helped to stabilize and strengthen the Islamic fundamental state present in the country.

The Taliban captured the city of Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan and declared them the legitimate government in the country. This appeal for an Islamic state appealed to many people and especially those who had fled the country during the decade long war with the Soviet Union, many residing in Pakistan; another country known for its instability, returned to fight with the Taliban. “As a result, some of the people trained under CIA command in the 1980’s, turned into loyal fighters for the Taliban. Armed and inflamed religious zeal spread throughout Afghanistan declaring to end the civil war, corruption and lawlessness. These camps soon became safe havens for men like Osama Bin Laden and other military terrorists. By the time the United States, as well as the rest of the world recognized the oppressive nature of the Taliban, interest towards getting involved in the country, in any capacity, was waning in the face of an apathetic public opinion. This

helped to encourage the downfall of the Afghan people. In the months leading up to September 11, 2001, the country of Afghanistan was in a state of fractionalized horror and oppression.

More than one million Afghan people had been killed during the decade long war and another five million had become refugees. Such tragic realities constitute one of the biggest hurdles that the Afghanistan foreign policy must be able to overcome. It has and will remain a perpetual problem for the country. What made it worse for the people of Afghanistan; many of which had no role in the events of September 11 and who deplore what had happened, still constituted a great deal of the collateral damage that was caused by the US led invasion of their country.

In the immediate weeks and months after September 11, 2001, in preparation for what was seen as foregone conclusion regarding a US led strike on their country, multitudes of the Afghan people fled the country, only to be met with resistance by bordering countries. Pakistan issued only a limited number of visas and then eventually halted the practice, leaving millions of Afghans to endure the impeding war. The Bush Administration, in October of 2001, promised more than $20 billion in foreign aid to the Afghan refugees as the Administration continued to repeat the rhetoric that the war was against terrorism and not the Afghan people.

However, as it is the case with most humanitarian promises, the full monetary support that was promised, has still not come to fruition. Once the U. S. led forces invaded and quickly disposed the Taliban regime, a number of changes were made to the

country. Even though the Taliban, despite their severe fractionalization, continue to regroup and fight for the cause of an Islamic state, its present power and influence is only a fraction compared to when they enjoyed the greatest amount of power and influence upon Afghanistan. The modern chapter of U.

S/Afghanistan foreign police began on September 12, 2001. As of November, 2007, US troops are still present in Afghanistan and promise to be there for years to come. “The expectations of the Afghan people that their lives would be improved have not yet been fulfilled. Washington’s promises that it would lead the international effort to rebuild Afghanistan and lead it into a democratic nation with a viable political and economic life able to ascertain a rightful position in the world community have been largely unfulfilled. ” As long as this remains a constant in the country, full support for the U.

S. led security force, will be fractionalized at best, and outwardly hostile at worst. There has been a plentiful supply of criticism towards The Bush Administration’s handling of the war in both Afghanistan as well as the Iraq, and to a greater degree, the plans, or lack there of, that have been implemented to build once the opposing forces had been disposed. Although this has not been the case to the same degree in Afghanistan as it has been in Iraq, there are still a number of factors which cannot help but serve as impediments towards U.

S/Afghanistan policy being realized to its full potential. It has been the policy of the Bush Administration, whether or not that has been correctly implemented, that is a matter of relativism,

is that as soon as the Afghan people can support themselves against a fractionalized Taliban, and can build their infrastructure to a level that is conducive to fiscal growth, the United States will leave. This has yet to come to fruition. There is no doubt that mistakes have been made on the part of the Bush Administration.

They are not highlighted to the same degree in comparison to what is currently transpiring in Iraq. However, in both countries, it is absolutely essential that each country eventually take the lead towards their own recovery. This is absolutely true with regard to Afghanistan. However, there now exists, a wide array of problems that have helped to curtail the realization of true and lasting growth in the country. Those problems have yet to be fixed and as a result, many news organizations report that the living conditions of the average Afghan has not improved in comparison to pre 9/11.

Whether or not the Afghan government contains the necessary tools to be sustainable, it has befallen on them to now run and build up their own country. Therefore, a study of Afghanistan’s foreign policy in relation to the desire of the Afghan people to improve their own infrastructure, is important to recognize, as well as the impediments that seem to follow every attempt to improve the lives of the average Afghan. One of the instances of foreign policy, which has been implemented on the part of the Afghan government, comes from a personal plea from her president, Hamid Karzai.

In January 2002, after attending President Bush’s State of the Union Address, spoke to a group of former Afghan nationals at Georgetown University.

Karzai would also speak to the United Nations General Assembly. Both speeches would encompass some of the very basic needs of the Afghan people. One need that President Karzai would detail was the personal plea that he made to millions of Afghans who were now spread across the world, either as forced refugees or as emigrants to another country. President Karzai pleaded for those ex patriots to come back to Afghanistan in order to help rebuild the infrastructure of the country.

Karzai also encouraged foreign investments as well since the country was in dire need of securing foreign investments and moneys of all variations. “70% of the country lived in poverty and dissatisfaction towards relief that would come slowly, would likely find it very difficult to gather the needed support for the new government in Afghanistan. ” This was a need that was quickly identified by both the American and Afghanistan governments. Implementing programs that would actually eradicate these problems; that would be an entirely different story.

Afghanistan’s foreign policy has hit a snag in the last few years. The reasons behind this are plentiful. However, at the same time, one cannot ignore the number of improvements that have occurred since the fall of the Taliban regime. Some of these include: “the adoption of a national development and budged framework, the reform of the central government, the return of millions of children to school and the repatriation of 2. 6 million refugees and the resettlement of 550,000 internally displaced peoples. Also, the introduction of a new currency in Afghanistan, brings hope that the Afghan people will one day be fiscally independent since foreign aid, as is the

case with most foreign aid, it is no substitute for real internal and impendent growth by a single country. However, there are many impediments to the continuation of the political process; problems which are seen with great rapidity in the Middle East. These problems are two fold and interchangeable and are at the heart of the problems which Afghanistan now endures; political and ethnic diversity.

A renewed political process which helps to marry the two successfully, is needed if the new government and the promises that it has given to its people, is not to be run off course by factional forces, bent on destroying the continuation of improvements that have already come to fruition in the country. Due to the fact that an independent Afghanistan has still not come to fruition, and thus, the foreign policy of the country is currently at a fraction of its potential, it would behoove both the America and Afghan governments, as part of their foreign policy, to focus on a number of key problems that is now facing the Afghan people.

Doing otherwise, does not correct the problem but in a sense, is placing a band aid over a bullet wound. Such lessons should have been learned with the 1991 invasion of Iraq. Dispelling the invading Iraqi forces from Kuwait, yet stopping short of eradicating the problem, will only empower the aggressor and promise further problems, not only for the United States, but the world security as the United Nations and their eighteen resolutions towards Iraq went ignored. The first impediment facing the realization of a successful and mutually beneficial US/Afghanistan policy is the lack of security in the country.

Afghanistan’s

security process has proceeded at a very slow rate. The lack of funding has further slowed the progress that must be realized. There exists adverse security conditions in the country; helping to dissuade potential workers from entering the country in order to help build up the country. The Taliban is still in power; although their base, are fractionalized and perform at a percentage of their current strength. Nevertheless, their presence serves as an impediment.

In this area, Afghanistan’s past also serves to derail the foreign policy of the country. The fact that Afghanistan faces serious factors which are still present from the decade long war with the Soviet Union. “Compounding this problem, is the legacy of a cumbersome bureaucratic inefficiency along with widespread corruption. ” There are few signs that Afghanistan will be free from such problems; problems which have done much and will continue to prevent the country from enjoying the full fruition of being a free and independent country.

A third problem is the fact that, historically speaking, nation building cannot be sustained unless there are internal forces within the country that are willing to take the lead in the rebuilding of the nation’s infrastructure. “Sustainable reform cannot be achieved if it is driven by outside forces. ” This is the realization behind the motivation of the US government in relation to its desire to leave Iraq as soon as they are able to defend and support themselves. Currently, the United States is supplying the bulk of the support, both through security and financial support.

As a result, the country is unstable and the war continues. Although to a less violent degree, the same is occurring

in Afghanistan. U. S. led forces will remain in the country until it becomes self evident that Afghans can independently rule Afghanistan. When this is able to happen, is still the guess, and that is exactly what a guess, by the various factions of the US government. The poor conditions of the Afghanistan government, as well as the poverty which seeks to cripple the spirits and shorten the lives of the Afghan people, serves as a serious impediment to their independence.

This was one of the motivations behind President Karzai’s appeal for foreign investments to come to Afghanistan. Money, along with the cessation of a fractionalized political and religious system in the country, is the key to lasting improvements coming to Afghanistan. Money, or rather the lack of it, will continue to serve as a problem for the Afghan people and the nation building of their country. This also is a problem for the United States government and the Bush Administration who continues to meet increased opposition by the Democrats and an increasing number of Republicans in Congress.

The Bonn Agreement, a process that promised to bring to Afghanistan, a period of unprecedented growth and independence for the country, was signed on December 5, 2001 and was supported by mostly anti-Taliban forces. The Bonn Agreement brought the presidency of Karzai as well as the adoption of a new Constitution and the implementation of bicameral branches of their government. What the Bonn Agreement has not been able to circumvent, is the problems that poverty brings to every aspect of the country, its people, and the political process. The political economy of Afghanistan remains extremely complex, a result of

decades of conflict and a disregard for central authority. ” Recently, there has been some continued good news to come out of Afghanistan. Spurned on by the introduction of a new currency only a few years ago, growth and poverty reduction has become a reality in the country. Two million former Afghans have come back to the country, either from surrounding countries as anxious refugees who want to return to the country of their birth.

An unusual aspect of Afghans foreign policy is to simply compel their former citizens to return to the country of their birth. “Twenty eight years of war, oppressive rule, and factionalized internal forces, have forced millions to leave their country, but the promise of a new and independent country. ” Afghanistan is somewhat optimistic about their future. This cannot come to fruition unless the International community seeks to make these changes a reality.

This too, constitutes an important and vital aspect of Afghanistan’s foreign policy. Afghanistan is in a state of rebuilding and until their infrastructure has been significantly improved, a foundation must first be built. Currently, “domestic forces have proved insufficient in repelling competing factions from derailing the peaceful political process. ” This is an essential aspect of successful nation building. The last chapter in the story of Afghanistan’s move towards an independent country, has yet to be written.

No country that has endured the same level of war, political and religious strife and home grown oppression, can emerge unscathed in a matter of a few short years. It has remained an important part of U. S Foreign policy that they remain in the lead until Afghanistan can prove to be capable

of building up their own infrastructure on their own. The reemergence of the Taliban and internal fighting in Congress, poverty and a multi million dollar opium drug trade, has all proved to be stumbling blocks towards a cessation of the US led forces in Afghanistan.

Their foreign policy at the current moment, is being monopolized by nation building as a donor driven improvement of a country’s infrastructure, rarely proved to offer sustainable progress. Despite one’s feelings about the war in Afghanistan and Iraq, the success of an independent Afghanistan, would behoove both the foreign policies of the United States as well as Afghanistan. Both countries anxiously await this goal to come to fruition.