Law Final Exam

Issue: Sullivan was Commissioner of Montgomery, AL, that supervised police force who imprisoned/assaulted civil rights protesters. New York Times then published advertisement purchased by four black ministers that allegedly defamed Sullivan Principals: Sullivan and New York Times Co. Decision: Sullivan couldn't prove actual malice (publication of a defamatory falsehood with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard as to whether it was false or not) Implications: Affects relationship between press and public officials/agencies. Requirement to prove actual malice. Allowance for human error. Differentiation between criticism directed at gov't rather than gov't officials. Central and privileged place of press in representative democracy. Public officials (hold public office which has been created by a constitution or legislative enactment) or public figures (voluntarily assumed role of special prominence in society) are owned by the public; public has right to know about public matters and activities of public officials (aggressive press protectes this area of public interest). The press gone from lapdog, watchdog, to junkyard gone. tab 12

Issue: Davis was a hearing impaired student who applied for admission to Southeastern's nursing programming. Sect. 504 prohibits discrimination of otherwise qualified individual based on disability. The issue was whether Davis was \"otherwise qualified\" despite her disability and how to interpret \"otherwise qualified.\" Principals: Davis (hearing impaired student), Southeastern (school) Decision: Court ruled that hearing impaired student was not otherwise qualified, despite accommodations made for disability. Furthermore, otherwise qualified is one who meets all program requirements (is able to master the essential elements in an instructional program) in spite of disability; disability does not exempt individual from satisfying legitimate requirements. Implications: Neither ADA (1990) nor Sect. 504 (of Rehabilitation Act of 1973) requires that the college fundamentally alter a program to make an accommodation; does not require institutions to modify existing programs substantially to allow disabled students to participate. 402 tab 14

Issue: Principals: Yeshiva (didn't want to allow collective bargaining of faculty), NLRB (wanted to provide Yeshiva faculty the opportunity to unionize) Decision: SCOTUS voted 5-4 to deny the right of collective bargaining and exclude Yeshiva faculty protection from by NLRB Implications: Academic professionals at private universities are excluded based on managerial roles assumed in participation in shared governance (mainly the faculty's role in hiring peers; at reputable institutions, senior faculty (in demanding shared governance) make majority of decisions, not the academic deans (not the case at community colleges)

Issue: Bradshaw became a quadriplegic following car accident in which an intoxicated Rawlings was driving; Rawlings was drunk because of consuming alcohol purchased by university funds and university employee for a university sponsored activity. Principals: Bradshaw (victim), Rawlings (driver) and Delaware Valley College Decision: University has no duty to care for non-minors (no special relationship existed); not required to stop a third-party from harming another student. Implications: Colleges and universities are not insurers of students' safety or the safety of guests on their campuses (190); except in certain narrowly defined circumstances.

Issue: The IRS chose to reject Bob Jones' tax exempt status based on their religiously based, racially segregated dating and marriage policies Principals: Bob Jones, Internal Revenue Service Decision: SCOTUS ruled the IRS decision constitutional. Implications: Laws or court decisions can affect the ability of religious institutions to retain religious distinctiveness

Issue: Mullins was a student at Pine Manor, an all-female insitution, when an unidentified assailant entered her on-campus room, forced her to another unlocked building on campus, where he proceeded to rape her. (inadequate security procedures, improper qualifications and competence of security personnel, faulty locking systems in residence hall doors, permitting assailant access to room; presence of males in halls overnight on weekends created foreseeable risks) Principals: Mullins (victim) and Pine Manor (all-female institution in urban Boston) including vice president of operations Decision: SCOTUS ruled that there was sufficient evidence to find the defendants negligent in providing protection from criminal acts by a third party (negligence was proximate cause of injury; due to an inadequate security system in which locks and gates were left unsecured, too few guards efficiently patrolled the grounds, and the key system was completely insufficient). Implications: Duty to protect against 3rd party, required by special relationship (failure to provide reasonable care to prevent foreseeable harm); was crime foreseeable, and was Pine Manor negligent in exercise of duty to care/protect? Although colleges are generally under no duty to protect students from the violent acts of third persons, there are certain special relationships that involve a duty to protect, such as when a student is forced to live (via policy) in institutional housing. Therefore, the college has a duty to take reasonable measures to protect their students against foreseeable criminal acts. Last, VPO was not entitled to immunity from claims based on his position as officer of charitable organization.

Issue: Kynast was a lacross player at Ashland University who threw down Hanson, of Ohio State, during match, causing Hanson to becoming quadriplegic. Hanson sued Ashland/Kynast, on grounds that Kynast was agent of institution and Ashland was liable for not having a proper emergency protocols (negligence). Principals: Kynast (Ashland player), Hanson (Ohio State player) Decision: Kynast was voluntarily participating, therefore not an agent of Ashland (respondeat superior), and that injuries were on impact, not delay of treatment. Hanson could not establish special duty owed to him or that injuries were from institution's agents. Implications: Institutions owe no duty of care to a student injured unless a special relationships can be established or negligence on the part of the institution's agents. No special relationship = not recruited by institution (420)

Issue: Furek was a sophomore fraternity pledge at University of Delaware who received significant burns as result of hazing activities, permanently scarring him, and causing him to withdraw and forfeit a full football scholarship. Fraternity had charter revoked by national organization and UD. Principals: Furek (victim) against campus charter and national fraternity organization, UD, and Joseph Donchez Decision: A jury awarded $30,000, apportioned 93% to UD, 7% to Donchez. Delaware SP ruled that national fraternity was not liable, that UD was liable for breach of duty of supervision and protection; the university's failure to protect did not rise to the level that would have justified an award of punitive damages (any new trial would thus be limited to issue of liability), and compensatory damages would be shared by the university and Donchez. Implications: Campuses must develop policies against hazing to protect students against dangers of injury or death and to avoid liability for damages resulting from negligence. A university is particularly vulnerable if officials have prior knowledge of hazing and fail to take precautionary measures that go beyond the distribution of disciplinary consequences for hazing infractions.

Issue: Kleinknecht suffered cardiac arrest and subsequently died during off-season practice. Plaintiffs claimed negligence was cause of death, insitution did not provide prompt treatment, nor had a written plan for medical emergencies, and neglected to insure coaches were CPR trained or had proper communication devices at practice (could have saved athlete). Principals: Kleinknecht's parents and Gettysburg College Decision: A special relationship existed between athlete and institution based on athlete's recruitment and subsequent participation in scheduled, sponsored, and supervised event for which the athlete was subject to control and supervision (owed a duty of care). Also found that danger of serious injury was foreseeable and owed duty of care to take precautions against risks of injury. Implications: Instition is not liable for actions of athletes in heat of competition, but still must provide reasonably safe conditions for participation. Futhermore, special relationship and duty to care is applicable when school exercises greater degree of control over student-athletes, especially to foresee potential risks and to take preventative action.(420-421) -

Issue: Nero was a summer student who was assaulted by fellow student (who was previously indicted for sexual assault; pending from previous semester) in basement of residence hall. Principals: Nero (victim), KSU Decision: Nero won; assault was foreseeable and KSU should have taken steps to assure safety of students in residence halls; duty to protect Nero, as a business invitee, who had a right to safety and liberty; proximate cause should have been foreseeable. Implications: Difficult balance between right to due process (for perpetrator) and rights to safety/liberty. Also poses interesting issue with public/private dichotomy (public university's hand tied by due process, where private school could have acted more swiftly). Some students are business invitees, which affords increased entitlement to reasonable duty of care.

Issue: Principals: Decision: SCOTUS upheld random drug testing of secondary school students who participate in interscholastic athletics Implications: There is a compelling interest that outweighs students' reasonable expectations of privacy. Also, impaired athletes present a health and safety risk to themselves and others engaged in athletic activities, that athletes have a limited expectation of privacy since participation means dressing and showering together, and because the test was not overly intrusive of students' privacy and is only used to test for drug use, and finally the school required written consent of the athletes and parents before testing.

Issue: Students objected to the mandatory fee because it was used to support RSOs engaging in political or ideological speech. Principals: Decision: SCOTUS declared that mandatory activity fee was constitutional as long as the mechanism to determine what RSOs received funding was viewpoint neutral. Implications: Fee is not for university-sponsored speech nor was it responsible for content of any of the RSOs speech; sole purpose of the activity was to facilitate \"fee and open exchange of ideas by, and among, its students\" (a legitimate government interest). Viewpoint neutrality standard ensures that universities protect their students' First Amendment interests; justifies both the institution of a mandatory fee and the disbursement of funds. May also enact viewpoint neutral restrictions on RSOs off-campus expenditures. Decision akin to objecting to unpopular ideas taught by faculty members funded through tuition dollars.

Issue: Law prohibited state agency employees use of state computers to view/download/store sexually explicit content, except as may be used for approved research projects. Faculty filed suit under the the auspices of academic freedom (for research purposes) and First Amendment right of free expression. Principals: Plaintiffs were six professors from various state institutions filed against Gilmore (who was...) Decision: SCOTUS denied certiorari (affirmed 4th Cir. ruling); en banc ruling upheld constitutionality of law prohibiting use of state owned computers to download sexually explicit internet sites. Implications: Academic freedom belongs to the university not individual faculty members or students. Law did not regulate employee speech on matters of public concern and, therefore, was not entitled to First Amendment protection. Court used Pickering Balance (rights of employees vs. rights of employers) and found speech did not touch on matters of public concern (therefore not protectable), and that public employees' speech had been purchased via salaries (could not comment as private citizens). First Amendment rights of academic freedom, which go beyond that given by First Amendment, accrued to the university not the individual professors.

Issue: Stanton was a high school student attending a summer athletic camp on the campus of the University of Southern Maine, when she was sexually assaulted by an acquaintance she met at a campus fraternity party in the dorm room she was occupying. She and parents filed suit alleging failure of duty to warn, breach of implied contract, and foreseeable assault. Principals: Stanton (high school student, camp attendee) and University of Southern Maine Decision: Stanton was a business invitee, and entitled to protection from foreseeable danger. University's failure to do these things were proximate cause of her injury and institution was therefore liable. Implications: Dealt with issue of business invitee (part of the framework for deciding if an institution has provided protection to which they were entitled under policy and law); one who is invited to the premises for transacting business and to whom a duty of care is owed (a student attending a college or university has the legal status of a business invitee). Also, institution is liable if negligent action is proven to be proximate cause of injury.

Issue: OK school district required all middle and high school students participating in extracurricular activities consent to a drug-testing program (urinalysis). Principals: Decision: Court upheld, reasoning that students who participate in extracurricular activities (including interscholastic athletics) voluntarily subject themselves to intrusions that lessen any expectation of privacy that might apply to the whole student body. Implications: Urinalysis is an insubstantial interference with privacy and the school district's interest is sufficient even if there is evidence of a pervasive drug problem at the school or among students participating in extracurricular programs. (Representatives of the school as well as)...because of the pernicious effect of substance abuse on the instructional process and extracurricular participation.

Issue: A young boy repeatedly harassed a young girl at school, of which the school was informed by the student, the student's mother, and other students; student's mother filed suit under Title IX (being denied equal access to an institution's resources and opportunities). Principals: Davis (mother of victim) and Monroe, AL school board, superintendent, and school's principal Decision: SCOTUS ruled that the school is liable for monetary damages if harassment takes place in context of school controlled activity and school acted with deliberate indifference. Implications: K-12 schools are liable for student-to-student harassment if school personnel have actual knowledge of behavior, demonstrate deliberate indifference to the harassment, and the harassment is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it intereferes with the victims ability to benefit from his or her educational opportunity (281)