Gender Inequities Essay Example
Gender Inequities Essay Example

Gender Inequities Essay Example

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  • Pages: 15 (3896 words)
  • Published: March 5, 2019
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In light of epistemology's difficulties in the search for certainty, my suggestion is to acknowledge it as a mistake and give up on the pursuit.

Admitting our uncertainty and moving forward is essential. We must question whether it is possible to live without certainty and if there are consequences for doing so. I will argue that it is possible to navigate without a useful understanding of certainty in terms of knowledge. Furthermore, I will argue that any potential consequences are not as significant as those faced by proponents of certainty as a valid concept of understanding. However, before delving deeper into these arguments, let us first examine the role of Plato and his quest for certainty in causing difficulties within epistemology.

According to Plato's Republic, knowledge requires certainty, which can only be achieved through an unchanging subject matter. Therefor

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e, true knowledge can only exist in the realm of unchanging forms and not in the constantly changing physical world. This renders the changing physical world as the domain of uncertain opinions. Consequently, various forms of knowledge that are deemed to be vital for science are downgraded. Although Plato has additional reasons for advocating his theory of forms, even if he had abandoned certainty, there would still be valid reasons to uphold the theory. Nonetheless, some of his perplexing pronouncements on epistemology would have lacked motivation. For instance, the doctrine of Recollection mentioned in the Meno suggests that everyone had prior contact with forms before birth as the sole explanation for the inherentness and certainty of geometrical knowledge.

No certainty, no problem. It would have been possible for him to accept the justified true belief analysis of knowledge, or tru

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belief with a logos, which he ultimately rejects in the Theaetetus. Epistemology could have advanced greatly, and someone from Hellenistic Greece could have become Ed Gettier. Descartes, perhaps a more well-known victim of the search for certainty, observed that he frequently made mistakes about things he believed he knew, even those he had great confidence in.

Not only have some of his well-grounded theories turned out to be incorrect, but even the most certain of things, like his mathematical calculations (who hasn't made a mathematical mistake?). Even his senses sometimes deceive him, when he experiences an illusion or hallucination. Due to this realization, he acknowledged that he is uncertain about what he knows and what he doesn't. Thus, he attempted to discern genuine knowledge from everything else. He believed that the only way to accomplish this is by questioning everything, to determine if there is anything that cannot be doubted.

In essence, the philosopher employed a rigorous certainty test. According to him, all knowledge is certain. Therefore, if there exists any genuine knowledge, it must be something completely impervious to doubt. To evaluate the certainty of his beliefs, he devised two well-known tests: the Dream test and the Evil Genius test. Every student who has taken introductory Philosophy is familiar with the subsequent process. Ultimately, only two things remain utterly beyond doubt: the fact of my existence and the nature of my present consciousness.

Both Descartes and Hume recognize the challenge of gaining knowledge about the external world due to the need for absolute certainty. While Descartes employs a questionable argument for the existence of God as a solution, even empiricists like Hume are not immune to this

desire for certainty. Both philosophers strive to determine the limits of human knowledge.

Unlike Descartes, Hume does not demand absolute certainty for knowledge. He is content with a lesser degree of confidence, which he calls "assurance." Regarding Relations of Ideas, Hume believes that it is satisfactory for them to be demonstrable. As for Matters of Fact, Hume posits that they can be either sensations or memories of sensations. While the senses and memory do not offer complete certainty, they are dependable enough to trust. Nonetheless, those familiar with Hume's philosophy understand its implications.

If all knowledge must fall into one of two categories, it is discovered that there can be no non-circularly grounded knowledge about anything beyond personal experiences. This is because any grounding would require reasoning, which depends on knowledge of cause and effect. Reasoning about cause and effect always relies on past experiences as only experience teaches us the connections between causes and effects. However, this type of reasoning can only provide information about things outside our own experiences if we assume those things are similar to our own experiences. The assumption cannot be proven through logic or learned from experience. Consequently, the problem of induction arises, causing trouble for Hume's limited certainty sought. Ultimately, this problem leads to Kant's transcendental idealism, Hegelian idealism, Schopenhauer, and Fichte.

In the quest for certainty, various forms of doubt have emerged, including skepticism, the problem of induction, and undesirable idealistic notions. This poses a significant challenge. However, is it feasible to completely renounce certainty? Although we can relinquish Descartes' unquestionable certainty as a criterion for knowledge, can we fully detach ourselves from Hume's more reasonable requirement that knowledge be

based on some form of justifiable certainty? To answer this question, we must comprehend what exactly we would be surrendering. The term "certainty" has different connotations and it is crucial not to attribute the flaws of certain uses to others. Initially, dismissing psychological certainty without hesitation is quite simple. The feeling of certainty is clearly unnecessary for knowledge and personal experiences demonstrate its insufficiency as well.

The text addresses the distinction between certainty, knowledge, and necessity. It emphasizes that the discussed kind of certainty is not synonymous with knowledge and rejecting certainty does not automatically mean embracing skepticism. The uncertainty regarding whether one can relinquish certainty without adopting skepticism remains unanswered; nevertheless, if skepticism becomes essential, it would be considered a defeat according to the author. Additionally, the existence of necessary truths is not disputed by the author. Not being able to establish certitude about a proposition does not imply that the proposition itself is contingent.

While it is uncertain if these concepts can be divided, I will view my project as a failure if it suggests the absence of fundamental truths. I am not requesting you to refrain from using words like "certain" and similar terms. Many words have everyday implications that do not pertain to profound understanding. Feel free to confidently state mundane facts like where you parked your car or when your birthday is, as long as you avoid employing such assertions to bolster any claims about knowledge.

In regards to giving up, it may be questioned what is left to ask of you. It is a challenging task to precisely specify. The primary request I am making is for you to relinquish any assertion

of being incapable of error, regardless of the subject or circumstance. No individual or domain possesses superior knowledge. Any person has the potential to be mistaken about any matter. Certainly, we are capable of being incorrect about the majority of logical and mathematical principles, regardless of their necessity.

Despite our subjective certainty that they are incorrect, even dialethic logicians (such as Graham Priest who believe in true contradictions) should not be dismissed without consideration; they may indeed have a valid argument. Moreover, there is a reasonable assumption that we can be mistaken about our own mental states to some extent. Bertrand Russell proposed that even the belief in my own existence could potentially be mistaken, as it implies the existence of a permanent substance underlying my thoughts. The philosophy of mind, including eliminative materialism and other movements, suggests that we can also err in positing our own thoughts or mental states by applying predicates that are irrelevant. However, expressing this doctrine about the human condition explicitly presents a challenge. A satisfactory formulation of this theory must satisfy two conditions.

The first requirement is a dilemma. It should not lead to skepticism or the denial of necessary truths. Some theorists attempt to restrict the thesis to only cover empirical truths, but there is reason to believe that we can also be mistaken about a priori truths. The second requirement is that accepting the formulation should be somehow inconsistent with being dogmatic. C.S. Peirce, a prominent fallibilist, believed that embracing fallibilism is necessary to ensure that the path of inquiry remains open, making it an excellent reason to be a fallibilist.

The promotion of intellectual humility as advantageous to the

process of inquiry has long been a reason for advocating and defending fallibilism. In the history of philosophy, dogmatism has taken different forms, from being seen as an epistemic flaw to outright rejection of skepticism. For this investigation, dogmatism should not be understood solely as having unwavering confidence in one's beliefs, even if that confidence is very high or surpasses the available evidence. Rather, I aim to define dogmatism as a tendency to react in a specific way when faced with challenges to one's beliefs.

The text discusses the concept of dogmatism, specifically as the inclination to disregard arguments or evidence that should be considered when forming beliefs. It is mentioned that this disposition can arise from various reasons and is not necessarily driven by overconfidence, although that is a common cause. Ignoring relevant evidence can be due to inadequate training or habits. Additionally, it is emphasized that this understanding of dogmatism makes it an objective matter to determine whether someone is dogmatic or not; anyone who ignores relevant evidence, regardless of their awareness, can be considered dogmatic. However, the previous paragraph presents a challenge when it comes to comprehending the second adequacy condition. It is unclear how any thesis can contradict a disposition, or anything other than another thesis.

The type of inconsistency we are seeking is not logical inconsistency, but rather inconsistency in relation to a moral code. For instance, greed, as a disposition, can be considered inconsistent with the Golden Rule. The Golden Rule is not a thesis, but it is a type of propositional entity. Greed is inconsistent with the Golden Rule because valuing and adhering to it provides strong motivation to avoid

greediness. Similarly, any acceptable expression of fallibilism should provide individuals with compelling reasons to resist being dogmatic.

The challenge in formulating fallibilism is to capture the idea that we should always be open to considering evidence against our beliefs, without implying that we know nothing or that necessary truths don't exist. Additionally, there is a danger that if I could be mistaken about any of my beliefs, then any of my beliefs could potentially be untrue. This includes tautologies, which can also possibly be false. Thus, defining fallibilism as the belief that all of my beliefs are possibly false, using non-epistemic concepts of possibility, is inadequate. Alternatively, fallibilism can be understood as asserting the epistemic possibility for any of my beliefs to be false; however, this approach merely replaces one unanalyzed notion with another requiring analysis. A precise definition of the fallibilist thesis necessitates explaining the concept of epistemic modality.

Susan Haack proposes a way to explain fallibilism by interpreting it as a disjunction. According to this interpretation, when I believe in a certain belief (represented as p), it is either not guaranteed to be true or there is the possibility that I could have believed something contradictory to p. The first part of this disjunction relates to fallibility in empirical matters, while the second part pertains to fallibility in things known a priori. In other words, my fallibility is demonstrated through my inability to accurately perceive the truth. When it comes to contingent a posteriori beliefs, I can believe any of them without them necessarily being true, which is acceptable for fallibilists. As for my a priori beliefs, some are necessarily true and others imply their

own truth based on my belief in them. However, in both cases, there remains the potential for me to hold different false beliefs instead.

The thesis of fallibilism is consistent with the claim that there are necessary truths and a priori truths. However, Haack's formulation of fallibilism (when combined with some plausible assumptions) suggests the possibility for us to believe anything at all.

Even if we interpret possibility in the broadest metaphysical sense, where the laws of human or non-human nature can vary, Haack's principle leads to the conclusion that there are no limits to our ability to believe. However, this consequence is considered unacceptable, and Haack tries a different approach. Haack acknowledges that fallibility resides in us and our beliefs rather than in the content of our beliefs. She argues that fallibilism means we do not have any foolproof methods to arrive at the truth, i.e., "that there are no infallible methods." Mott notes that this definition does not fully capture fallibilism as it allows for a certain level of dogmatism since we can still believe that we are very likely right. In essence, while this definition accurately describes our epistemic state, it does not support enough caution in our beliefs, which is what fallibilists desire. To address this issue, Mott suggests a more profound acknowledgment that "we are always wrong." However, this suggestion cannot be accepted universally and literally, as it would immediately create paradoxes. Instead, the idea is that in our high-level theorizing about various subjects, there is always some degree of inaccuracy, and we are unaware of where that inaccuracy lies beforehand. Consequently, according to Mott, it is highly probable that all our

high-level theories are false.

I leave as an exercise for the audience why this doesn't escape paradox. George Schlesinger, while developing his own view, criticizes both Motts and Carriers. He finds Motts' final version of the fallibilism thesis insufficient, although he agrees with Motts' rejection of Haacks' version. A significant criticism is that Motts' statement of fallibilism--which states that there are no infallible methods--implies that there are no methods that consistently yield the correct answer regarding the truth value of a given proposition.

However, the claim made by fallibilists is much weaker compared to what they intend. They argue that certainty about any proposition is never something we can achieve. On the other hand, according to Motts principle, we can be certain most of the time when using a particular method, as long as we are not always certain when using that method. Therefore, while Motts thesis fulfills the first adequacy condition (it does not imply that we know nothing or that there are no necessary truths), it fails to meet the second condition as it is compatible with a dogmatic attitude. According to Schlesinger, Carrier's thesis faces even more difficulties. It is inconsistent with the assertion that we do know some things and hence does not satisfy the first adequacy criterion. The proof is as follows.

Whenever I know a proposition p to be true, I also know that any disjunction with p as a disjunct is true, thanks to Carriers definition of the being-mistaken operator. This includes the disjunction of p with the claim that I don't believe p, which is equivalent to knowing that I am not mistaken about p. Therefore, for any proposition p,

knowing its truth allows me to also know that I am not mistaken about it.

Carrier objects that Schlesinger requires a disputed principle of inference, namely the Principle of Knowledge by Entailment (PKE), to support his argument. According to PKE, if you know that p and know that p implies q, then you also know that q. However, it should be clear that Schlesinger does not necessarily endorse such a strong principle. Firstly, he only needs it to be true that when you know that p, then you know that (p or q); he does not need to make any broader claims about entailment. Secondly, he does not have to agree that you always know the logical consequences of your beliefs, but just that you can come to know some of them, which is surely a non-controversial point. If I know that p and can consequently know that I am not mistaken about p, then it is possible for me to have infallible beliefs. This means that fallibilism is incorrect, even based on Carrier's own interpretation of it.

Schlesinger's positive account involves differentiating multiple levels of justification. He subsequently defines corresponding levels of epistemic possibility as the absence of the respective degree of justification for denying the proposition at hand. This leads to the conclusion that there are multiple levels of fallibilism, each characterized by the assertion that all propositions are epistemically possible. However, this version of the thesis is challenging to evaluate, as its plausibility depends solely on undefined operators representing degrees of justification. It is conceivable that Schlesinger's thesis-schema for fallibilism fails to meet our criteria for adequacy in defining justification. The fundamental problem with

all these perspectives is that they either lack normative significance or acquire such significance at the expense of skepticism.

They are all attempting to define fallibilism as both an explanation of our current state of knowledge and a guide for how we should interact with others who seek knowledge. While some may have a vague understanding of the dual nature of fallibilism, Haack argues that it is primarily an epistemological thesis about our tendency to hold false beliefs, as well as a recommendation to always be open to revising our beliefs when new evidence arises. Schlesinger, on the other hand, views fallibilism not as a purely metaphysical concept but as a practical one subscribed by many. He criticizes Haack's definition, claiming that it relies on logical possibility and therefore could still accommodate total infallibility. If this is the case, it would also support complete dogmatism in all of my beliefs.

Carrier argues that defining Fallibilism to be compatible with universal omniscience is problematic. He claims that being both omniscient and fallible seems contradictory, but this is only an illusion. The contradiction arises if one considers omniscience as not just knowing all truths, but necessarily knowing all truths. However, Carrier's observation holds truth. Regardless of how the descriptive thesis is formulated, accepting its truth does not preclude a dogmatic attitude in specific situations.

Despite acknowledging my own fallibility and the potential for error in my thinking, I consistently assert that in this particular instance, I am absolutely correct and therefore have no need to listen to others. This type of fallibilism does not serve the purpose of promoting open-mindedness. So, what can effectively challenge dogmatism? There are two possible

approaches. The first, which I anticipate will be more popular, is to conclude that fallibilism is flawed and that certainty can still be attained. My only concerns with this perspective are that believing in certainty is tactically dangerous, as it leads to theories of forms, problems of induction, and idealism. Additionally, I argue that such certainty can fuel a harmful dogmatism in some individuals. However, there are compelling reasons to suggest that this second objection holds more weight than it may initially seem. Let's assume that it is indeed preferable for all of us to adopt a non-dogmatic approach where we don't hold any position as so well justified that we dismiss challenges to it.

We have reason to believe that this statement is true based on strong inductive evidence. We can imagine challenges to any claim that are not obviously insane. As we previously mentioned, even the law of non-contradiction has been challenged in a way that cannot be easily dismissed as crazy. To understand the basis for this appropriate behavior, we must first understand how descriptive facts are connected to normative proprieties. It is clear that the description of underlying facts does not necessarily imply that the normative propriety is valid. Describing a football game using the language of physics does not imply that certain movements should be considered as instances of defensive pass interference.

Both the arrangement of objects in space and the rules of football are examples of normative proprieties. These elements alone may lead to the intended outcome. One perspective on epistemic principles is that they are essential components of justification and knowledge, based entirely on natural facts about individuals and their

surroundings. True epistemic principles accurately describe the circumstances under which individuals are well-equipped in relation to their field of knowledge. Another viewpoint is that justification and knowledge have some degree of irreducible normativity, making epistemic principles recommendations for effective information acquisition strategies. To claim that someone knows something or is justified in believing something involves endorsing their cognitive state or the process by which they reached that state. Evaluating an epistemic principle involves determining whether individuals should adhere to it.

The principle of fallibilism is the same as the second picture of the function of epistemic principles. This view, originated by Wittgenstein and Sellars, considers epistemic talk as a sub-practice of linguistic practice, focused on requesting, providing, and assessing reasons. It is considered a rule-governed language game. According to this perspective, Cartesian foundationalist principles can be viewed as recommendations regarding which assertions should be unquestioned and which should be defended when challenged.

The assertion of my existence and the description of my present thoughts cannot be disputed. Other claims, however, must be supported by deductive reasoning derived from these immune claims in the event of a challenge. Even the most exaggerated doubts are considered valid challenges. Naturalistic views of epistemic principles suggest that fallibilism is likely not sustainable. However, the normative perspective of epistemic principles offers a more favorable outlook for fallibilism, understanding it as a suggestion for appropriate behavior in discussions about knowledge. The proposal is that it is preferable for us to treat each other in a manner where no statements are exempt from criticism. Any claim, regardless of its logical necessity or privileged access, must be defended when faced with a challenge that follows

the rules of engagement.

Although we may strongly believe that Graham Priest is incorrect in his challenge to the law of non-contradiction, we cannot dismiss his opinions. It is worth considering that he challenges this law using premises he is entitled to hold and by methods we consider reasonable. Therefore, we must be prepared to respond to his challenge fairly. While there may be certain claims that we cannot possibly be mistaken about, it is still advisable to adhere to the principle of fallibilism. The rationale behind this principle is not directly determined by any specific facts about us.

All attempts to make underlying facts explicit have failed and led to skepticism or the belief that there are no necessary truths. They have also resulted in other negative consequences. Instead, we should acknowledge that we are often wrong, including about things we feel certain about, and that we are poor judges of our own intellectual efforts. This realization should make us extremely cautious. Just like a judge should not rule on a case in which they have a personal interest due to the potential bias, we should behave as if we could be wrong in any given situation because we are frequently mistaken. Even if we cannot actually be wrong, we should still treat each of our beliefs as potentially erroneous. The concept of fallibilism addresses the question of which rules are most suitable for the pursuit of knowledge.

So, the concept of fallibilism should be interpreted as a guideline for our epistemic pursuits rather than a statement about our abilities.

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