Eisenhower’s Containment Through Action by Inaction During the Suez Canal Crisis Essay Example

full executive power through the repeated use of action by inaction; that is, refusing to act immediately in light of a crisis and instead using meticulous planning, close and informal consultation with cabinet members, and a blend of diplomatic pressure and placidity in order to assert America’s dominance in the region-and, consequently, over communism.

The nationalization of the Suez Canal occurred at a time of pandemonium-ridden relationships between several international players: The United States, Great Britain, France, Israel, the U. S. S. R and Egypt. Tensions had reached a peak point between oil-dependent Western European powers and the rise of Arab nationalists who promoted a rejection of influence from non-Arab powers.

Helping to stir the pot even more was the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, which could be traced back to Great Britain’s occupation and influence in the area, especially in regards to actions such as the Balfour Declaration and the White Paper that would make the Western Powers appear pro-Zionist and, consequently, anti-Arab. The expunging of Western influence from the area that began during this time, particularly by pan-Arab Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, ran concurrently with the rise of the Cold War that exasperated hostility between the democratic Western powers and the Soviet Union.

A dedication to containment, along with an intimate series of ties between the US and the oil-dependent European powers, inevitably led to American involvement in the area, beginning with the Eisenhower presidency. Eisenhower arrived in the Oval Office in the planning stages of one of the US’ first (and, arguably, most controversial) major involvements in the Middle East. Only eight months into his Presidency did he, by “use

of the president’s ‘good offices’ and a Central Intelligence Agency-sponsored coup” (Kingseed 29), remove Iranian Prime Minister Mossadeq from power.

The placing of the US-supported Shah back into power, alongside a promise of “assistance in the event of a Soviet attack” (Kingseed 30), not only reflected the extent of the oil-dependency of Great Britain and French in the region, but offered evidence that Eisenhower’s policies in the region would be primarily pioneered by “the president’s personal desire to exclude the Soviet Union from the Middle East” (Kingseed 26) via the establishment and maintenance of regional stability.

Eisenhower’s view that the way to prevent the spread of communism to the Middle East was by promoting stability in the region between both the Western powers and the Arab powers went on to guide his policy towards the Middle East.

Eisenhower’s goals for US involvement in the Middle East “reflected the president’s own cold war ideology and included promoting regional stability, guaranteeing the free flow of Middle Eastern oil to Western Europe, supporting Arab nationalism and Israeli independence, improving relationships with the Arab states, hastening the decline of European empires, maintaining the solidarity of the Western alliance, and avoiding an arms race between Israel and its Arab neighbors, with the United

States and Russia the principal arms suppliers” (Ambrose 328-329). The President’s commitment to these goals of maintaining relationships and containing communism accounts for many of the trends that would characterize Eisenhower’s conduct in the Middle East.

Among these trends were: Eisenhower’s reliance on frequent-but-informal consultations with a small number of appointees; his tendency to try and delay the inevitable for as long

as possible as to allow for planning; his hesitation towards nearly any action, whether it be to take action or to cease taking action; his encouragement for vagueness and secrecy pertaining to the Crisis; and finally, his ability to firmly and effectively communicate his full executive power.

Eisenhower’s decision-making process during the Crisis is said to reflect that of his decision-making process as Supreme Allied Commander during Operation overlord, where “He based his final decision on his analysis of his mission and available resources, as well as those of his adversary” and “repeatedly consulted with various senior advisers in order to obtain the best advice available” while still having the final decision to invade rest upon his shoulders” (Kingseed 45).

His actions during the Suez Crisis, particularly in going against deep-rooted alliances in order to promote international diplomacy, are also comparable to his decision to stop supporting France during the Indochina war. All in all, Eisenhower would practice a kind of ‘tiptoe diplomacy’ during the course of his involvement in the Middle East, using delays in action and negotiation skills to allow for sufficient planning to ultimately achieve his objectives.

This “tiptoe diplomacy” policy, in which Eisenhower both avoided direct involvement but participated heavily in diplomatic planning and negotiation, manifested itself early in the events leading to the crisis. One such example lies in the US’ conduct following a pact signed between Turkey and Iraq that aimed “to ensure the internal stability of the Middle East” (Kingseed 31). The US urged Iran, Great Britain and Pakistan to enter into what would be called the Baghdad Pact.

Though praised by Eisenhower “as

one of the major gains for the system of collective security”, the US never became a full-fledged member of the organization, even as it “participated in the establishment of permanent political and military liaison” (Howard 88).

The decision to not formally become involved in the Pact while still being heavily involved in its organization proved strategic to the Eisenhower administration in the way that it allowed for the control of the containment operation without having a direct connection to something that would (and did) result in a negative response from both Nasser and the U. S. S. R. Another instance in which Eisenhower pushed containment in the region was in his response to Nasser’s declaration on September 27, 1955 that Egypt was planning to trade its domestic cotton production for Soviet arms from Czechoslovakia. Cautious after the formation of the Baghdad Pact (and, consequently, what would be known as the “Northern Tier”) only served to cause Nasser to mistrust Western influence more, Eisenhower did not react rashly, despite the level of anti-communist fear that was present during the time.

Rather than attempt to intimidate Nasser, Eisenhower sent Chief of Naval Operations Burke to a dinner with Egyptian ambassador Ahmen Hussein, hoping to secure “an alternative to secure Nasser’s friendship and hopefully block further Soviet influence” (Kingseed 32). Eisenhower even kept his composure in light of Egypt’s recognition of the People’s Republic of China in May 1955. Eisenhower stated his position on the matter clearly; “We think Egypt is mistaken, but a single unwelcome act should not destroy friendship for that nation any more than spats within a family should lead to a divorce court”

(Neff 58).

This message not only appealed to Nasser, but helped delay British and French military action in the area despite growing hostility between the European and Egyptian leaders. In short, Eisenhower handled these situations as he would handle most of the events during the Suez Crisis: through practicing a limited diplomatic flexibility that would delay action in favor of negotiation and planning, but that would ultimately apply firm diplomatic force if no agreement could be reached. Eisenhower’s limited flexibility became evident in its slow-but-eventual withdrawal in financial support for the Aswan Dam.

In yet another bold push for containment, the U. S. had conducted negotiations to secure Western financing for the dam during November of 1955; an act that was followed by a series of what were seen as pro-Soviet actions by Nasser and a failed series of negotiations that resulted in the dropping of Western support for the project in July 1956. Though a close counselor to Nasser made the remark that “the Egyptian president came to the conclusion that the United States was serious for possibly one month at the beginning of 1956 about helping to finance the High Dam” (Kingseed 37), the US would delay dropping support for s long as possible, waiting until it was evident that negotiation was nearly impossible. As he had done during the French-Indochina War, Eisenhower ignored advice from numerous parts of Congress, whom had warned him from as early as February 1956 to withdraw financial support; instead waiting until there was not only virtually no Congressional support for the project, but until Egypt countered the Western Powers’ final offer with terms that were

considered unacceptable.

This was an affronting of executive power to not only Congress but to Nasser as well, as Eisenhower proved that he would not compromise his agenda by compromising to Nasser’s conditions. This, of course, angered Nasser, prompting the nationalization of the Aswan Dam project, and, subsequently, the Suez Crisis. Eisenhower’s delay of response and reluctance to pursue direct action in the Middle East certainly gained criticism at a time from a variety of sources: the British and French, Nasser’s Egypt, Eisenhower’s cabinet and Congress, and the American public.

His meticulous use of a state of underactivity in the region, paired with his moderate domestic platform, helped contribute to American’s image of him as the cool-headed “grandfather figure” President who did little to push the limits; an image that would certainly help him in his reelection bid. Indeed, Eisenhower’s careful strategy in the Middle East, especially in lieu of the Crisis that happened to unfold during the final few months of the 1956 Presidential election, would help carry the “Peace President” into his second term of one of the most highly regarded Presidencies of all time.

This would be done through maintaining relations (between politicians at home and abroad, as well as with the American public) while still asserting individual authority; a task perhaps only possible in the stage of the unfolding conflict between the West and Middle East by a President with the sort of cool collectedness demonstrated by Eisenhower.

The extent of Eisenhower’s ability to keep calm in light of an international breakdown was perhaps best exemplified by the contrast in reactions between him and his European counterparts,

Anthony Eden and Guy Mollet, whose initial responses were to condemn Nasser and to resort to using force. Eisenhower would instead attempt to create negotiation between the conflicting powers; both pushing for any sort of possible solution while delaying the inevitable aggression.

A number of diplomatic attempts to reconcile Anglo-French interests with the vigorous nationalistic policies of Nasser characterized the first three months of the Suez Crisis”(Kingseed 68); particularly in the form of the US-proposed first (August 16-23) and second (September 19-21) London conferences that would attempt to negotiate an agreement pertaining to the international regulation of the canal (the first through the Five Powers Plan, and the second through the formation of the Suez Canal Users Association).

Of course, Nasser rejected both invitation to and proposals from the two conferences, and French and British forces would again act rashly, going immediately to the UN following Nasser’s rejection of SCUA without advising Eisenhower. In his usual manner, Eisenhower would respond to this surprise act collectedly, sending Secretary of State Dulles to meet with French and British leaders immediately preceding the UN Conference in order to convey his message of continuous firm rejection of the use of force.

Though the UN would inevitably fail to solve the issue, leaving the British and French to work alongside Israel in invading Egypt, Eisenhower managed to keep his composure, maintaining his push for diplomacy through the use of cabinet members and repeated negotiations. Eisenhower’s use of Dulles in this situation highlights an important facet of Eisenhower’s discreet method of exercising powerful executive will; his use of his close (and, consequently, informal) relationships with cabinet members for

advice and for assistance but never for direct decision making.

Eisenhower’s “theories of executive management followed a noticeable pattern of making a division between policy development (including long-range planning) and operations that required his personal involvement” (Kingseed 9), allowing for a complete exercise of Presidential power under a cool premise of careful planning and assistance from cabinet members.

Another prominent feature of Eisenhower’s relationship with the other members of the government was its informality; most of his meetings were advisors were ad hoc in which the President would discuss current affairs and possible solutions for something that he would enact; “Although he expected most operations to be carried out at departmental level within the guidelines of policy developed by the NSC staff and coordinated at the interagency level by the Operations Coordination Board during crisis operations that required Eisenhower’s direct participation, the decision-making forum was a small group of intimate advisers, who furnished the president with a wide range of recommendations on the specific aspects of an evolving situation” (Kingseed 91).

Nonetheless, he would continually report to these trusted appointees throughout the bulk of the Crisis (much like he had as Allied Commander), using close advice and his ability to send men abroad to make the most informed decisions…and, more importantly, to carry the message of Eisenhower’s decisions abroad, as is best illustrated by Eisenhower’s instructions to Dulles upon the outbreak of the crisis: “Foster, you tell them, goddamn it, we’re going to the United Nations.

We’re going to do everything that there is so we can stop this thing. (Kingseed 89) True to his word, Eisenhower introduced an item on

the invasion on the morning of October 30th, only one day after the invasion had begun, while simultaneously keeping in constant contact with British and French leaders via tripartite meetings between ambassadors and through cable communications with political leaders. Though this action was unable to stop the invasion of British and French troops into Egypt on the 31st, it did help assume Eisenhower’s leading role in handling the unraveling event. The United Nations General Assembly convened on the evening of November 1st, resulting in a resolution ordering “an immediate cease-fire, the withdrawal of all forces behind the armistice lines, a ban on all military aid to the belligerents, and action to reopen the Suez Canal”(Kingseed 110).

The resolution would be adopted by all but five of the convening nations, leaving the British and French (whom rejected the resolution) at an awkward international position that would further weaken individual prestige and subordinate them to Eisenhower’s aims. In doing this, Eisenhower asserted his international role of righteousness to multiple fronts: obviously to the French and British, but also in beating the U. S. S. R. to the UN. This was especially important in continuing containment and in attempting to sway Nasser to maintain relations with the West, as recent situations concerning the spread of Communism into Hungary had been stirring up Cold War tensions that had temporarily overshadowed the US’ concern with the canal situation until this point.

Furthermore, this would serve the key role of distinguishing the US’ aims for the Middle East (these specific aims in kingseed book, look it up) from the aims of the French and British; a distinction that would

carry over after the crisis, as the US saw an increase of influence concurrently with the decline of British and French presence there. While pressure increased on the British and French to halt their aggression, Eisenhower maintained the “period of placidity” (Neff 36) on the homefront that characterized his reign as executive on the home front. He did this by assuring the American public of his commitment to the rejection of force via a televised press conference on October 31st, by placing the Secretary of State in charge of press releases and silencing vocal figures on the crisis (such as Vice President Nixon) and by evacuating the area of American citizens that very day via a readiness plan devised by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Radford.

Up until the address, Eisenhower had been careful to let out information to the public pertaining to the sensitive matter, and his control over the release of information on the crisis is indicative of his ability and desire to conduct strong foreign policy acts while appearing either as if there was nothing to worry about or that he had total control. This not only kept public opinion at bay but served the strategic advantage of concealing Eisenhower’s plans from other powers so that he could successfully enact them. For instance, in another example of Eisenhower’s use of ‘action by inaction’, the US failed to act upon acquiring knowledge of the presence of French aircraft in the Middle East during mid-October; instead postponing consultation with French and British leaders amid fears of alienating Nasser.

Eisenhower again displayed this tendency in his refusing to formally condemn the

US’ European allies following the invasion and bombing by Anglo-French forces of Egypt. The US would continue this policy of vague firmness until the resolution of the crisis, relaxing tensions at home while firmly pushing for resolve from the aggressing sides. As aforementioned, the mistake of the French and British in rejecting the UN-adopted resolution calling for ceasefire would weaken the European powers to the will of Eisenhower, causing them to accept the resolution as early as November 6th. This would result from the heavy amount of pressure put onto French and British leaders from the UN and, upon the British and French’s continued rejection of US and UN attempts from peace, Eisenhower himself.

This would come first resolution resulting from an emergency United Nations session on November 3rd that established a command for an “emergency international force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities (Kingseed 116)” in the Middle East. When British and French troops took Port Said, Eisenhower was forced not only to exert his role as a domineering international figure, but to play the role of mediator that was ever-so-important during the Cold War. Eisenhower again successfully deflected Soviet involvement in the region on November 5th by rejecting Soviet Premier Nikolai Bulganin’s proposal for a joint US-USSR intervention in the conflict.

Again, this shows Eisenhower’s action-by-inaction, as he assumed a role of nonaggression while asserting his decision to Bulganin by sending a formal response in which the US rejected the proposal and urged the USSR to withdraw troops from Hungary; a bold act that would help to curtail Soviet expansion into the area and to increasingly put pressure on

Anglo-French troops to leave, due to the impending economic threat of potential war with Russia. Eisenhower further implemented his cunning coolness by delaying the formal release of this message until after an increase of American forces into the Middle East, placing the same kind of pressure on the Soviet Union that he had placed on the French and British.

This was another smart move by Eisenhower in maintaining diplomacy, as the British and French progressively weakened to a state of dependency on the United States, particularly in light of the oil shortage that would strike the powers as a result of the powers’ aggression during the Crisis. On November 3rd, the British and French suffered a huge economic blow due to two events: Syria’s severance of ties with the two countries, and the destruction of three pumping stations along the Iraqi Petroleum Company pipeline. In typical fashion, Eisenhower would respond to the oil crisis faced by the British and French “by being not too quick in attempting to render extraordinary assistance, preferring to keep the economic pressure on his erstwhile allies” (Kingseed 118) while meanwhile arranging for the Office of Defense Mobilization to work out arrangements to handle the oil situation if it deteriorated to a dangerous low.

This exasperated the already-frantic state of Prime Minister Eden, whose decreasing popularity among his Parliament and public (especially in times of an oil crisis) paired with Eisenhower’s relentless diplomatic pressure that existed in his ability “to exert the greatest possible restraint lest this situation radically deteriorate” (Kingseed 119), caused Eden (and, consequently, Mollet), to accept the UN resolution on November 6, just as Anglo-French troops

began to close in on the Canal. The withdrawal of Anglo-French troops, along with the US’ retraction of government and private aid to Israel following their initial refusal to withdraw, spurned Israel’s evacuation from the area shortly thereafter.

Eisenhower’s success in halting the progression of the 1956 Suez Crisis into a full-scale war no doubt thrust the United States into a long-term involvement with the region. Regardless of whether or not Eisenhower had intended to establish the United States as a dominant power in the region, he succeeded in his ultimate goal of preventing the spread of Soviet influence to Egypt. He was able to do this by projecting the image of an at-ease, level-headed President; an image that was true not due to indifference on Eisenhower’s part, but to his commitment to collaborative, cautious planning and cunning authority that was vital to the success of a President operating during a time as tense and as strange as the Cold War.